In English law, nervous shock describes a psychiatric illness or injury inflicted on a person by negligence or intentional act. The degree of disorder experienced by the applicant must amount to a mental illness – such as reactive depression or anxiety neurosis – for the nervous shock claim to be valid. An allegation of negligent nervous shock must prove that there was negligence and that another person`s recklessness or inaction caused an acute emotional reaction on the part of the victim. To prove negligence, it must be proved that: Under English law, nervous shock is a psychiatric/mental illness or injury inflicted on one person by the intentional or negligent acts or omissions of another. It is often a psychiatric disorder triggered by an accident, such as an injury to parents or spouse. Although the term “nervous shock” has been described as “inaccurate” and “misleading”[1], it continues to be used as a useful abbreviation for a complex concept. The possibility of claiming damages due to nervous shock, in particular due to negligence, is severely limited under English law. Fearing wrongdoing and unlimited liability of the defendant to any person who might suffer nervous shock in one form or another, the English courts have developed a number of “control mechanisms” or limitations of liability for nervous shock. These control mechanisms are generally intended to limit the scope of the defendant`s duty of care so as not to cause nervous shock, causation and remoteness. In another case that followed, the decision of the House of Lords was somewhat confusing. However, this has led to a distinction between primary and secondary victims. Primary and secondary victims – A primary victim is a victim who is directly involved in an accident and who sustains injuries as a result of the fault of an injured party.
A secondary victim is a victim who experiences nervous shock without being directly exposed to a physical danger to the main victim of the accident. The position of the principal victim is governed by the decision in Page v. Smith argues that a plaintiff can obtain compensation for psychiatric harm even if the threatened physical harm does not occur. Lord Lloyd argued that if a claimant could recover from a psychiatric illness in a case where he had actually suffered physical harm, it should follow that if the plaintiff had escaped reasonably foreseeable physical harm by chance, he should not be deprived of compensation by the existence of that purely fortuitous event. In essence,the purpose of this case was that,where there was a risk of bodily harm,physical harm and psychological harm should be considered as one and the same. This case is silent if the victim is the secondary victim. The situation with respect to secondary victims is governed by Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire.
The House of Lords has established three control mechanisms that must be considered in the case of secondary victims before the accused can be held liable for damages. Secondary victims of psychiatric disorders not only had to prove that their injuries were reasonably foreseeable; but also had to meet the following three criteria: A case of intentionally inflicted nerve shock would require one person to inflict emotional stress on another person for no good reason, and knowing the result would lead to an acute emotional response in the other person. An example of this case could be a practical joke that traumatizes the person on whom the joke is being played. Responsibility for psychiatric injuries depends in part on the type of injuries sustained and how they were sustained. If a claimant suffers both physical and psychiatric harm (even if the bodily injury was very minor), he or she is entitled to compensation in the usual manner, subject to issues of causation, etc.